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Comment
A Rebuttable Presumption of Dedication:
Protecting the Hard-Luck Patentee From
Johnson & Johnston's Dedication Rule
Thomas R. Hipkins*

To further the constitutional
Progress of Science and useful
system must carefully balance the
for patent owners with the need

objective of "promot[ing] the
Arts,"1 an effective patent
need to provide fair coverage
to provide fair notice to the

public of what it can and cannot do. 2 Fair coverage induces

inventors to invent, and more importantly, induces others to
invest in the invention's development.3 Fair notice allows
competitors to use a patent's disclosure to "design around" the
patent without fear of liability, and perhaps thereby improve
on the invention. 4 The judiciary has debated on how to strike
the proper balance when a patentee discloses subject matter in
the specification-the part of the patent document that
describes the invention-but does not include it in the claims* J.D. Candidate 2003, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S.M.E.
2000, Minnesota State University, Mankato. I am indebted to the Editors and
Staff Members of the Minnesota Law Review for their contributions to this
Comment. Specifically, I would like to thank Heather McNeff, Rachel Clark
Hughey, Amy Salmela, and Ryan Brauer for their efforts. Special thanks to
Eve and Claire for their constant reminder of what is truly important.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. See Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(discussing the patent system's balance between protecting exclusive rights
and adding to the "store of knowledge"); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1017, 1024 (1989) (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
480-81 (1974)).
3. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1024-25 (noting that exclusive rights
are critical as "too few inventions will be made in the absence of patent
protection because inventions once made are easily appropriated by
competitors of the original inventor who have not shared in the costs of
invention").
4. See Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1045, 1056-57 (2001).
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the part of the patent document that delineates the property
rights.5 On one hand, the judiciary has created the doctrine of
from
making
copyists
prevents
which
equivalents,
insubstantial changes to escape the literal claim language and
avoid liability.6 One could argue that someone who practiced
disclosed but unclaimed subject matter would be liable to the
patentee for infringement, if such subject matter were
equivalent to the claimed subject matter. On the other hand,
the judiciary has also created the dedication rule, which states
unclaimed subject matter is dedicated to the
that disclosed but
7
public domain.
In Johnson & Johnston Associates v. R.E. Services Co., the
Federal Circuit had the opportunity to determine whether
patentees could assert property rights in disclosed but
unclaimed subject matter under the doctrine of equivalents or8
whether such subject matter was dedicated to the public.
Rather than carefully striking a protection/notice balance, the
court held that such subject matter was dedicated to the public
regardless of the surrounding facts. 9 Since then, the Supreme
Court, in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
rejected a similar rule that limited patentees' access to the
doctrine of equivalents, holding that such a rule would unfairly
upset the protection/notice balance by stripping patentees of
vital protection.' 0
This Comment asserts that future courts should not follow
the Johnson & Johnston bright-line dedication rule because it
is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's doctrine of
equivalents cases, as evidenced by the Court's recent decision
in Festo. Part I of this Comment surveys the relevant patent
law landscape. Part II details the Johnson & Johnston holding
and its supporting rationale. Part III explains why the
Johnson & Johnston rule impermissibly upsets the Supreme
5.

See, e.g., Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046,

1051 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam); YBM Magnex, Inc. v. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 145 F.3d 1317, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86
F.3d 1098, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
6. See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S.

605, 607-08 (1950).
7. See, e.g., Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1562-63
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
8. 285 F.3d at 1051.
9. Id. at 1054.
10.

122 S. Ct. 1831,

1840-41 (2002) (rejecting the Federal Circuit's

"absolute bar" approach to prosecution history estoppel).
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Court's notice and protection balance, and proposes a rule for
application in future dedication cases. This Comment urges
future courts deciding cases in which patentees disclose but do
not claim equivalent subject matter to apply a rebuttable
presumption of dedication.
I. REALIZING A PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN
PROTECTION AND NOTICE
Granting exclusive rights to inventors is key to an effective
patent scheme because, in a free-market economy, the
exclusivity is the only economic justification for investing large
amounts of money and human resources in developing new
inventions and then disclosing them to the public."I For
example, it costs an average of $800 million, and takes between
twelve and fifteen years, to develop and test each new
pharmaceutical through FDA approval. 12 If a pharmaceutical
company knew that at the end of drug development, its
competitors could skip the research and testing stages and
simply copy its research results to create and market identical
products, it would logically do one of two things: it would
refrain from investing in drug development altogether, 13 or it
would protect the process and the product's formula via trade
secret. 14 Both actions would stifle innovation and deprive the
public of potentially life-saving pharmaceuticals. 15 The patent
11. See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
CommercializingInventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707-12 (2000).
12. Gary S. Becker, Get the FDA Out of the Way, and Drug Prices Will
Drop, BUS. WK., Sept. 16, 2002, at 16; see also Pfizer Inc., The Value & Cost of
Pharmaceuticals: Questions & Answers, at http://www.pfizer.com/pfizerinc/

policy/medicare-q&a.html (reporting that it costs more than $500 million and
takes an average of fifteen years to get a drug approved by the FDA) (last

visited Oct. 4, 2002).
13. Kieff, supra note 11, at 710.
14. See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in
Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 266 (1998) (stating that, as a

result of inventors keeping their inventions secret, "future innovators will not
be able to learn from the scientific and technological insights that led to the
original invention, slowing the overall rate of innovation").
15. One commentator expressed the undesirable consequences of an
economic system in which inventors did not get exclusive rights to their
inventions as follows:
Why should one entrepreneur incur the cost and the risk of
experimenting with a new machine if another can look on, ascertain
whether the device works well or not, and duplicate it if it is
successful? Under such conditions the man who watches others,
avoids their losses, and shares their gains is the one who makes
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system's protection function is essential to inducing innovation.
Notifying the rest of the world of the patentee's exclusive
rights, however, allows others to "design around" the patent.
That is, read the patent and create new inventions from what
16
they learn without fear of being sued for infringement.
Ambiguity in the scope of the exclusive rights creates "[a] zone
of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter
only at the risk of infringement." 17 A robust notice function
benefits society by making incremental innovative advances
8
possible.'
In most instances, these two critical interests furthered by
the patent system-the protection function and the notice
function-conflict with each other. 19
Balancing these
respective interests is vital to a good patent system, but is often
difficult to do. 20 When a patentee attempts to assert the
doctrine of equivalents to cover disclosed but unclaimed subject
21
matter, this difficulty becomes manifest.

money; and the system that gave a man no control over the use of his
inventions would result in a rivalry in waiting for others rather than
an effort to distance others in originating improvements.
JOHN BATES CLARK, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMIC THEORY 360 (1907).
16. See John N. Kandara, Note, Application of the Doctrine of Equivalents
to Means Plus Function Claims: WMS Gaming Inc. v. International Game
Technology, 50 DUKE L.J. 887, 891 (2000) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000)).
17. United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942).
18. Ellisen S. Turner, Note, Swallowing the Apple Whole: Improper Patent
Use by Local Rule, 100 MICH. L. REV. 640, 646 (2001).
19. Conigliaro et al., supra note 4, at 1057 ("The protective and notice
functions of patents exist in some tension.").
20. See id. at 1053 ("The difficulty is that the stronger the rights the law
grants to pioneering inventors, the more difficult it becomes for others to
improve on those pioneering inventions.").
21. See Scott R. Boalick, Note, The Dedication Rule and the Doctrine of
Equivalents: A Proposal for Reconciliation, 87 GEO. L.J. 2363, 2364 (1999).
The author noted,
Although the disclosed subject matter is not specifically claimed as
part of the invention, anyone making, using, or selling the subject
matter could still be liable for patent infringement if the doctrine of
equivalents is found to apply. This tension between the public notice
function of the claims and the doctrine of equivalents has been
present in U.S. patent law since its inception.
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A. PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS
1. Obtaining a Patent
To obtain a patent, applicants must convince the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) that both their
their
application
satisfy
statutory
invention
and
requirements.2 2 The Patent Act requires inventions, which are
measured wholly by the language of the patent claim, to consist
of patentable subject matter, 23 to be novel, 24 to be useful, 25 and
to be nonobvious. 26 The Patent Act requires applications to
satisfy the enablement requirement, the written description
requirement, and the claim definiteness requirement. 27 The
enablement requirement mandates applicants to disclose
enough about the invention in the application's specification
section to enable a skilled artisan to make and use it.2 8 To
satisfy the written description requirement, the applicant's
specification must "convey with reasonable clarity to those
skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she
was in possession of the invention."29 Claim definiteness
requires applicants to particularly point out and distinctly
claim the subject matter they regard as their invention. 30 The
claims, like the "metes and bounds" of a deed, define a
31
patentee's property rights in a patent.
The applicant engages in a negotiation process, called
prosecution, with an examiner at the USPTO to establish his
invention's patentability. 32 All of the correspondence between
the examiner and the applicant is kept in a file called the
prosecution history. Once the applicant and the examiner
22. John M. Czarnetzky, Note, Altering Nature's Blueprints for Profit:
PatentingMulticellularAnimals, 74 VA. L. REV. 1327, 1336 (1988).

23. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§
§
§
§

102(a).
101.
103.
112.

28. Id. § 112, 1.
29. New Railroad Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1295
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64
(Fed. Cir. 1991)).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2.
31.

See Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d

1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
32. 35 U.S.C. § 131; Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the
Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 776 (1999).
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agree on the patent's property rights, the patent issues, the
prosecution history is published, and the exclusive rights
33
become enforceable.
Inventors who are dissatisfied with their claims' scope
have two options to correct it, depending on when they decide
to take action. An applicant who wishes to broaden his claim's
scope before issuance can file a continuation application, which
allows a patentee to modify the claim's scope while keeping the
same disclosure. 34 A patentee wishing to broaden his claim's
scope after issuance can file a broadening reissue application,
35
in which the patentee can simply correct the claims.
2. Enforcing a Patent's Exclusive Rights
The U.S. patent system grants applicants who satisfy
patentability requirements the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the claimed inventions for twenty
years from the date their application was filed. 36 A patentee

can sue anyone who infringes those exclusive rights. 37 Once
litigation ensues, the first step in determining whether a
particular product or process infringes a patent claim is to
39
construe the claim. 38 In what is called a Markman hearing,
40
the court construes the claims by consulting both intrinsic
and extrinsic4 l sources.4 2 The fact finder 43 then investigates
33. See Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable
Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
1, 44 n.188 (1997).
34. See 35 U.S.C. § 120; Jay David Schainholz, Note, The Validity of
Patents After Market Testing: A New and Improved Experimental Use
Doctrine?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 388 n.87 (1985).
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 251; Boalick supra note 21, at 2367-68.
36. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a).
37. Id. § 281.
38. Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 267 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
39. Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve
Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2001) (referring to claim
construction hearings as Markman hearings).
These proceedings are so
dubbed because of the Supreme Court's decision in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). There, the Court clarified that claim
construction is a matter of law. Id. at 372.
40. Intrinsic sources include the claim language, patent specification, and
prosecution history. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,
979-80 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quoting Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939
F.2d 1558, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
41. Extrinsic sources include expert testimony, dictionaries, and treatises.
Id. at 980.
42. See id. at 979-80.
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the similarities between the construed claims and the accused
44
device.
B. RELEVANT PATENT LAW JURISPRUDENCE: THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS AND THE DEDICATION RULE

Two conflicting patent law doctrines, both dating back to
the nineteenth century, 45 surface in the discussion of the
disclosed but unclaimed equivalents. 46 They are the doctrine of
equivalents and the dedication rule. 47 To assert property rights
in disclosed but unclaimed subject matter, a patentee's only
option is the doctrine of equivalents. 48 One could read the
dedication rule, however, as preventing patentees from
asserting any property rights in such subject matter, including
by resorting to the doctrine of equivalents. 49 Though in
apparent conflict, each doctrine finds support in patent
jurisprudence.
1. The Doctrine of Equivalents
The doctrine of equivalents is a judicially created doctrine
that expands the scope of a patentee's exclusive rights to
include products or processes that are substantially equivalent
to the claimed invention. 50 It prevents an "unscrupulous
copyist" from committing "fraud on a patent."51 For instance,
43. The fact finder is either a jury or a judge in a bench trial.
44. Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 267 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Infringement is a question of fact. Markman, 517 U.S. at 384.
45. See Edward Miller & Co. v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 352
(1881) (applying the dedication rule); Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.)
330, 342 (1853) (applying the rule that later became known as the doctrine of
equivalents).
46. See Boalick, supra note 21, at 2363-64.
47. Id.
48. Catalina Mktg. Int'l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 812
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that, even though an accused device does not
literally infringe, it may infringe under the doctrine of equivalents).
49. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (en banc); Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d
1098, 1106-07 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
50. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677,
683-84 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("To say that the doctrine of equivalents extends or
enlarges the claims is a contradiction in terms. The claims-i.e., the scope of
patent protection as defined by the claims-remain the same and application
of the doctrine expands the right to exclude to 'equivalents' of what is
claimed.").
51. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08
(1950).
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suppose a pharmaceutical company's patent claims a
composition of four chemical elements. The claims recite one of
the elements as "between 2.2 and 2.5 grams of Chemical X." A
competitor copies the other three elements exactly, but includes
2.5001 grams of Chemical X. If the pharmaceutical company's
exclusive rights extended only to embodiments that fell within
the claim's literal language, the competitor would escape
liability. The competitor could avoid the twelve to fifteen years
and $800 million invested by the average pharmaceutical
company and make a seemingly unfair profit.5 2 In response to
situations like this, courts created the doctrine of equivalents. 3
In patent litigation, after the Markman hearing, 54 the fact
finder reads the claims on the accused product or process. 55 To
find infringement, the fact finder must find every claim
limitation or its substantial equivalent in the accused product
or process. 56 An element in the accused device is equivalent to
a claim limitation if the differences between them are
57
insubstantial.
52. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
53. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607-08.
54. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
56. See DeMarini Sports v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (citing Wolverine World Wide, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 38 F.3d 1192, 1199
(Fed. Cir. 1994)). The Federal Circuit prefers the use of the term "element" to
refer to a component in the accused device, and the term "limitation" to refer
to a component of the claimed invention. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 563 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2000), rev'd on other
grounds, 122 S. Ct. 1831, 1840 (2002). The requirement that the accused
product or process must have every claim limitation or its substantial
equivalent has been dubbed the "all-limitations rule." To illustrate the alllimitations rule, consider the pharmaceutical example. See supra notes 50-52
and accompanying text. For the pharmaceutical company to successfully
prove infringement of its drug patent, the accused composition would have to
contain all four of the claim limitations, either literally or by equivalents.
Therefore, suppose the accused composition contained 2.6 grams of Chemical
X, and only two of the other three claim limitations. The all-limitations rule
would prevent the pharmaceutical company from asserting the doctrine of
equivalents irrespective of whether 2.6 grams of Chemical X was equivalent to
"between 2.2 and 2.5 grams of Chemical X."
57. Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1423 (Fed. Cir.
1997). To determine whether the difference between the claim limitations and
the accused elements are insubstantial, "[an important factor is whether
persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the
interchangeability." Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S.
605, 609 (1950). Also, courts have determined substantiality by asking
"whether the accused device 'performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result' as the claim limitation."

20031

PROTECTING THE HARD-LUCK PATENTEE

787

58
Originally announced almost a century and a half ago,
the doctrine of equivalents took root in two landmark twentieth
century patent cases, namely Graver Tank & Manufacturing
Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 59 and Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chemical Co.60
In both cases, the Court
acknowledged that the doctrine of equivalents creates
uncertainty for competitors, but held that its protection
function benefits outweighed the uncertainty. 6 1 In the Court's
first twenty-first century doctrine of equivalents case, Festo
Co., the Court
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
62
restated this protection/notice balance.

a. Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products
Co.
The Supreme Court comprehensively endorsed the doctrine
of equivalents in 1950 in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v.
Linde Air Products Co. 63 There, the claimed invention was a
welding flux, one component of which was a chemical known as
a silicate. 64 The accused flux used a manganese silicate.65 In
earlier litigation involving the same patent, the Supreme Court
66
had invalidated a claim to "silicates" and "metallic silicates,"
but the patentee asserted a still valid claim to "alkaline earth
metal silicates." 67 The accused manganese silicate was a
"silicate" and a "metallic silicate," but was not an "alkaline
earth metal silicate." 68 The Court noted that the doctrine of
Catalina Mktg. Int'l v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 813 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (quoting Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608).
58. See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 342 (1853)

(recognizing that the patentee's claim covered not only the embodiment
contained within the claim, but also "all other forms which embody his

invention").
59. 339 U.S. at 607-10.
60. 520 U.S. 17, 25-42 (1997).
61. See id. at 28-29 (applying the doctrine of equivalents despite concerns
regarding indiscriminate application of it); Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607
(applying the doctrine of equivalents, but noting that courts' first resort must

be to the literal claim language).
62.

122 S. Ct. 1831, 1837-38 (2002).

63.

339 U.S. at 607-10.

64. See id. at 610.

65. Id.
66. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 276-77
(1949) (Graver Tank II).
67. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 610.
68. Id. Several other claims that literally encompassed manganese were
invalidated in prior litigation as being too broad. See id. at 616 (Black, J.,
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equivalents was "not the prisoner of a formula,"69 and affirmed
the lower court's finding of infringement. 70 The Graver Tank
Court held that although the manganese silicate was not
literally an71 "alkaline earth metal silicate," it was an
equivalent.
b. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
The Supreme Court revisited the doctrine of equivalents in
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,72 a case in
which the accused infringer, with heavy support from amici,
The Court
advocated for the doctrine's abolition. 73
unanimously upheld the doctrine's viability.74 After endorsing
a flexible application of the doctrine of equivalents, 75 the Court
attempted to clarify a safeguard designed to prevent its
76
indiscriminate application: prosecution history estoppel.
dissenting) (referring to Graver Tank II).
69. Id. at 609.
70. Id. at 612.
71. Id. ("Though infringement was not literal, the changes which avoid
literal infringement are colorable only.").

72. 520 U.S. 17, 25-42 (1997).
73. See Donald S. Chisum, The Supreme Court and Patent Law: Does
Shallow Reasoning Lead to Thin Law?, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 1819 (1999) (discussing the Warner-Jenkinson amicus briefs).
74. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 25-28. The Court rejected the
accused infringer's four arguments that the judicially created doctrine of
equivalents did not survive the 1952 Patent Act amendments. Id. at 25-28.
The accused infringer's four arguments are summarized as follows. The first
three related to 35 U.S.C. § 112, the reissue process, and the prosecution
process respectively. Id. at 25. The Court held that because these arguments
with respect to the 1952 Patent Act amendments were substantially the same
as arguments rejected in Graver Tank with respect to the 1870 Patent Act
amendments, they should suffer the same fate. See id. at 26. The accused
infringer's fourth argument was that the "and equivalents thereof' language
contained in the "means-plus-function" provision found in 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6
precluded courts from allowing the additional protection of the doctrine of
equivalents. Id. at 25-28. The Court rejected that argument
because § 112, 16 was enacted as a targeted cure to a specific problem
[i.e., a court decision rejecting a "means-plus-function" claim], and
because the reference in that provision to "equivalents" appears to be
no more than a prophylactic against potential side effects of that cure,
such limited congressional action should not be overread for negative
implications.
Id. at 28.
75. See id. at 24 (quoting Graver Tank as stating that what "constitutes
equivalency must be determined against the context of the patent, the prior
art, and the particular circumstances of the case").
76. See id. at 30-34.
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Prosecution history estoppel precludes patentees from
asserting the doctrine of equivalents to cover subject matter
surrendered by a patentability-related amendment during
prosecution. 77
To determine which amendments were
patentability-related, the Court announced a rebuttable
presumption. 78 Unless the patentee could show otherwise,
courts were to
presume that the amendment was related to
79
patentability.
c.

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.

In 2002, the Supreme Court rejected a bright-line rule
limiting the doctrine of equivalents by unanimously reversing
the Federal Circuit in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co.80 The Federal Circuit had held that "prosecution
history estoppel acts as a complete bar to the application of the
doctrine of equivalents when an amendment has narrowed the
scope of a claim for a reason related to patentability." 8 1
77. See id. at 31-32. To illustrate prosecution history estoppel, consider
the pharmaceutical example. See supra Part I.B.1. Suppose the USPTO
rejected the pharmaceutical company's claim to "between 2.2 and 2.5 grams of
Chemical X." The pharmaceutical company, to overcome that rejection,
amended its claim to read "between 2.2 and 2.4 grams of Chemical X."
Prosecution history estoppel would preclude the pharmaceutical company from
asserting the doctrine of equivalents to cover a composition containing 2.5
grams of Chemical X. This is so, regardless of whether 2.5 grams of Chemical
X is equivalent to 'between 2.2 and 2.4 grams of Chemical X."
78. See Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. at 33.
79. Id.
80. 122 S. Ct. 1831, 1840-42 (2002). In dealing with the prosecution
history estoppel issue presented by the Festo facts, the Supreme Court did not
directly address the Johnson & Johnston dedication rule. See id. at 1839-40
(noting that the two questions presented were what kinds of amendments
should give rise to estoppel, and whether estoppel prevents patentees from
asserting any range of equivalence). The Federal Circuit's absolute bar rule
for prosecution history estoppel, however, was similar to the Johnson &
Johnston dedication rule in that both purported to limit patentees' access to
the doctrine of the equivalents in the name of fair notice. See Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 575 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (noting that the absolute bar "preserv[es] the notice function of patent
claims"), rev'd, 122 S.Ct. 1831 (2002); infra note 154 and accompanying text.
81. Festo, 234 F.3d at 574. The Federal Circuit's prosecution history
estoppel rule-dubbed a "complete bar," id.-would work in the following way:
As in note 56's illustration, suppose the pharmaceutical company amended its
claim from "between 2.2 and 2.5 grams of Chemical X" to "between 2.2 and 2.4
grams of Chemical X" to overcome a USPTO rejection. An absolute bar would
prevent the pharmaceutical company not only from covering compositions
containing 2.5 grams of Chemical X under the doctrine of equivalents, but also
compositions containing any amount greater than 2.4 grams of Chemical X,
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In reversing the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court noted
that "the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the
essence of a thing in a patent application." 82 It would be unfair,
the Court reasoned, to penalize a patentee for failing to
delineate a crisp line when such a line, because of the nature of
the invention, was incapable of crisp delineation. 83 The
purpose of prosecution history estoppel is to hold patentees to
the lines they crisply delineate during prosecution, granting
them property rights in subject matter inside those lines and
preventing them from asserting property rights in anything
84
outside.
Continuing the rebuttable presumption trend started in
Warner-Jenkinson, the Festo Court announced a rebuttable
presumption of prosecution history estoppel.8 5 Unless the
patentee can show that he did not abandon all claims of
equivalence to the amended limitation, he would be presumed
estopped from asserting the doctrine of equivalents with
respect to that limitation.8 6 The Festo decision made clear that
the doctrine of equivalents will continue to exist as a valuable
protection tool despite its adverse effect on the notice
7
function.8
2. The Dedication Rule
The dedication rule states that disclosed but unclaimed
subject matter is dedicated to the public.8 8 Under this rule,
patentees lose all property rights to such subject matter. 89 The
including 2.4001 grams.
82. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1837.
83. See id. The business community recognized that the Supreme Court's
reversal of the Federal Circuit's absolute bar restored needed protection to
patentees. See Scott Ritter, High Court Sets Aside Decision That Imperiled
Inventor Rule, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2002, at A4, available at 2002 WL-WSJ

3396041.
84. See Festo, 122 S.Ct. at 1839.
85. Id. at 1842.
86. Id. The Court provided three cases in which the patentee could rebut
the presumption: (1) when "[tihe equivalent [was] unforeseeable at the time of
the application"; (2) when "the rationale underlying the amendment...
bear[s] no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question"; and

(3) "some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be
expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question." Id.
87. See id. at 1837-38.
88. Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
89.

See id.
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Supreme Court first announced this rule in the late nineteenth
century in Edward Miller & Co. v. Bridgeport Brass Co. 90
Shortly thereafter, the Court reiterated the rule in Mahn v.
Harwood.9 1 Then, after a long absence, the Federal Circuit
revived the dedication rule in its 1991 decision in Unique
92
Concepts, Inc. v. Brown.
a. Edward Miller & Co. v. Bridgeport Brass Co.
In Edward Miller, after fifteen years had passed since the
patentee's original patent issued, a market had developed (that
included the patentee) for subject matter that he had disclosed
but failed to claim. 93 The patentee obtained a broadening
reissue patent 94 covering such subject matter, and attempted to
95
assert it against one of his competitors.
The Court invalidated the broadening reissue patent,
holding that the Patent Commissioner was without authority to
grant such a patent after such an unreasonable delay. 96 To
prevent the harm to the notice function that would result from
allowing patentees to assert property rights in subject matter
that had clearly been in the public domain for such a long
period of time, the Court announced its now familiar dedication
rule: "[Tihe claim of a specific device or combination, and an
omission to claim other devices or combinations apparent on
the face of the patent, are, in law, a dedication to the public of
97
that which is not claimed."

90.
91.
92.
93.

104 U.S. 350, 352 (1881).
112 U.S. 354, 361 (1884).
939 F.2d at 1562-63.
104 U.S. at 351.

94. There was not yet a statutory provision specifically addressing time
limits for obtaining broadening reissue patents. See Boalick, supra note 21, at
2383 n.223. The patentee simply used the ordinary reissue procedure for the
sole purpose of enlarging the scope of his claims. See Edward Miller, 104 U.S.
at 350-51.
95. Edward Miller, 104 U.S. at 350-51.
96. Id. at 355 ("The granting of a reissue [merely to enlarge the scope of
the claims], after an unreasonable delay, is clearly an abuse of the power to
grant reissues, and may justly be declared illegal and void."). Because the
Court invalidated the broadening reissue patent, it never addressed whether
the accused product actually infringed. Id. Therefore, the Court had no
opportunity to apply, or refuse to apply, the doctrine of equivalents.
97. Id. at 352.
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b. Mahn v. Harwood
Three years after Edward Miller, the Supreme Court again
addressed the dedication rule in Mahn v. Harwood.98 On facts
similar to Edward Miller, the Court invalidated a broadening
reissue patent9 9 because it did not issue until nearly four years
after the original patent issued. 0 0 The Court noted the
importance of holding patentees accountable for actions that
notify the world that they hold no property rights in the
disclosed but unclaimed subject matter.10'
c.

Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown
More than a century later, the Federal Circuit revived the
10 2
dedication rule in 1991 in Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown.
The court held that the accused product did not literally
contain all of the claim limitations because the patentee
dedicated it to the public by disclosing it and failing to claim
it.10 3

Holding otherwise, according to the court, would

encourage applicants to disclose broadly, claim narrowly to
avoid USPTO scrutiny, and assert property rights in the
disclosed but unclaimed subject matter after the patent issues.
In other words, it would encourage applicants to sneak broad
claims past the USPTO. 10 4 Notably, the Unique Concepts court
went on to apply the doctrine of equivalents, finding the
accused product to be not equivalent to the claimed
invention. 05
3. Disclosed but Unclaimed Subject Matter
The doctrine of equivalents and the dedication rule pull in
opposite directions when a patentee discloses equivalent
98.

112 U.S. 354, 361 (1884).

99. As in Edward Miller, there was not yet a statutory limit on time for
obtaining broadening reissue patents. See supra note 94 and accompanying
text. The patentee simply used the reissue proceeding for the sole purpose of
enlarging his claims. Mahn, 112 U.S. at 357 ("It is apparent that, in the
reissue, the claim of invention is greatly enlarged.").
100. Id. at 363-64.
101. See id. at 361 (stating that disclosing but failing to claim was "notice
to all the world ...

that all those parts of the art, machine or manufacture set

out and described in the specification and not embraced in such specific claim,
are not claimed by the patentee").
102.

939 F.2d 1558, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

103. Id. at 1564.
104.
105.

See id. at 1562.
See id. at 1563-64.
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subject matter but fails to claim it. The dedication rule of
Edward Miller and Mahn suggests that disclosed but
unclaimed equivalents are dedicated to the public and are not
part of the patentee's exclusive rights. 106 The doctrine of
equivalents, if applied broadly, however, suggests that
patentees have the right to prevent competitors from practicing
subject matter that is equivalent to their claimed invention,
regardless of whether it is disclosed in the specification. 107 No
Supreme Court decision has directly addressed whether
patentees can assert the doctrine of equivalents to cover
disclosed but unclaimed equivalents. 108 The Supreme Court
has twice incidentally addressed the issue-in Graver Tank'0 9
0-and those
and in Warner-JenkinsonIOI
opinions suggest that
the dedication rule from Edward Miller and Mahn is not
appropriate. Prior to Johnson & Johnston, the Federal Circuit
had also addressed the issue twice, resulting in an apparent
internal conflict. I '
a. Supreme Court References to Disclosed but Unclaimed
Equivalents
In Justice Black's Graver Tank dissent, he argued that the
patentee should not be able to assert the doctrine of equivalents
to cover the manganese silicate because it was disclosed in the
specification and did not fall within the alkaline earth metal
claim. 1 2 In other words, Justice Black argued that when the
Court earlier invalidated the claims covering manganese, it
caused manganese to be dedicated to the public. Justice Black
could not convince the majority of the Court to adopt such a
rule.
In addressing the issue of what subject matter could
106. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (announcing Edward
Miller's rule); see also supra note 98 and accompanying text (stating that
Mahn followed Edward Miller).
107. Boalick, supra note 21, at 2364.

108. Id.
109.
110.

339 U.S. 605, 613-14 (1950).
520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997).

111. YBM Magnex, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 145 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir.
1998); Maxwell v. J. Baker, Co., 86 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The Federal
Circuit also addressed the issue, in a non-precedential opinion. Brunswick
Corp. v. United States, Nos. 97-5017, 97-5021, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 7198, at
*10-11 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 31, 1998) (following the holding in Maxwell).
112. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 613-14 (Black, J., dissenting); see supra Part
I.B. 1.a (discussing Graver Tank).
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qualify as an equivalent, the Warner-Jenkinson Court
discussed three scopes of protection under the doctrine of
equivalents, which may be analogized to three concentric
circles, each encompassing more subject matter than the one
before. 113 The smallest circle, advocated by the accused
infringer, encompassed only subject matter that was "disclosed
within the patent itself."114 The Warner-JenkinsonCourt called
such a proposition "severe" and refused to adopt it.'" 5 The
medium-sized circle encompassed all subject matter that was
known at the time of issuance to be equivalent, whether
disclosed or not. 1 6 The Warner-Jenkinson Court stated that
even fixing the boundary of what subject matter could be
equivalent at the medium-sized circle would result in too much
harm to the protection function. 117 The Warner-Jenkinson
Court held that patentees could rightly assert the doctrine of
equivalents to cover all subject matter that fell within the third
circle, which included subject matter known at the time of
issuance to be equivalent, whether disclosed or not, and all
subject matter that was later developed to be equivalent. 1 8
Thus, according to the Warner-Jenkinson Court, patentees may
assert property rights in subject matter falling within the
largest concentric circle if it is equivalent to their claimed
inventions.
b. Federal CircuitPrecedentDirectly Addressing Disclosed but
Unclaimed Equivalents
Although the Supreme Court has not directly decided
whether a patentee can assert the doctrine of equivalents to
cover disclosed but unclaimed equivalents, the Federal Circuit
addressed the question on two occasions before Johnson &
Johnston.1 9 The two holdings appear to conflict with each

other. 120
In Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 12 1 the Federal Circuit cited
Unique Concepts and held that the dedication rule prevents
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. at 37.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
See Boalick, supra note 21, at 2390-91.
86 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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patentees from asserting property rights in disclosed but
unclaimed subject matter, either literally or under the doctrine
of equivalents. 122 Like Unique Concepts, the Maxwell court
feared the prospect of patentees sneaking broad claims past the
USPTO by disclosing broadly, claiming narrowly to avoid
USPTO scrutiny, and asserting property rights in the disclosed
but unclaimed subject matter after the patent issues. 123
In YBM
Magnex, Inc. v. International Trade
Commission,124 the Federal Circuit refused to follow
Maxwell. 125 Although both the Maxwell patentee and the YBM
Magnex patentee asserted the doctrine of equivalents
attempting to cover disclosed but unclaimed subject matter, the
YBM Magnex court split a hair and distinguished Maxwell. 126
According to the YBM Magnex court, Maxwell's holding,
preventing patentees from asserting the doctrine of equivalents
to cover disclosed but unclaimed subject matter, applied only to
27
Maxwell's facts.1
II. JOHNSON & JOHNSTONASSOCIATES v. R.E.
SERVICE CO.
In Johnson & Johnston, the claimed invention was a
method for manufacturing printed circuit boards (PCBs). 128
122. Id. at 1106-07 (citing Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558,
1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
123. See id. at 1107.
124. 145 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
125. Id. at 1320-22.
126. Id. at 1320 (stating that "Maxwell accords with the [Supreme] Court's
precedent only when its decision is understood and applied in light of its
particular facts"). According to the YBM Magnex court, the Maxwell patentee
disclosed but failed to claim a.distinct embodiment, see id. at 1320, whereas
the YBM Magnex patentee disclosed a range broader than he claimed. See id.
at 1318-19 (noting that the patentee claimed "6,000 to 35,000," but the accused
infringer practiced the disclosed but unclaimed range of "between 5,450 and
6,000"). The court used this distinction to justify different outcomes. See id.
at 1322.
127. See id. at 1320.
128. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046,
1054-55 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (en banc). One could argue that the
patentee who discloses but fails to claim subject matter could get a broadening
reissue patent within two years of issuance and assert the doctrine of
equivalents on it. By so doing, the argument would go, the patentee would
trump the dedication rule, thus refuting the claim that "whenever the
dedication rule applies, it trumps the doctrine of equivalents." The problem
with this argument is that, by getting a broadening reissue patent within two
years of issuance, the patentee does not trump the dedication rule because the
dedication rule would not have applied. The Johnson & Johnston dedication
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Manufacturing PCBs requires placement of fragile copper foils
onto nonconductive material. 129 Workers would often damage
the foils during manual placement. 130 The claimed invention
allowed workers to adhere the copper foils to a stiffer substrate
for placement. 13 1 After placing the copper foil/substrate
could remove the substrate, leaving
combination, the worker
2
foil.13
copper
the
only
The patent disclosed steel and aluminum as substrate
The accused
materials, but only claimed aluminum. 133
infringer's method was the same as the claimed method, but
used the disclosed but unclaimed steel substrate. 134 The
district court granted the accused infringer's motion for
summary judgment of no literal infringement. 135 At trial,
however, the jury's verdict found the accused infringer liable
for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 136 After a
hearing before a three-judge panel, the court sua sponte
ordered an en banc rehearing. 3 7 The issue for the full court
was not whether steel was equivalent to aluminum, but
whether, by disclosing steel and failing to claim it, the patentee
38
had dedicated it to the public. 1
The Federal Circuit, in Johnson & Johnston, had the
rule applies only in litigation, after the Markman hearing, when the claims'
scope becomes clear. After all, there is no way to know for sure what subject

matter is disclosed but unclaimed until the court determines what is claimed.
Under Johnson & Johnston's rule, in any particular case where the patentee

attempts, post-Markman, to assert the doctrine of equivalents to cover
disclosed but unclaimed subject matter, the dedication rule trumps the
doctrine of equivalents.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 1049.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 1050. The Johnson & Johnston patentee filed for and
received two continuation patents, see supra note 34 and accompanying text,
that literally covered the accused steel substrate. See Johnson & Johnston,

285 F.3d. at 1055. These patents, however, did not issue until after the
litigation between Johnson & Johnston Associates and R.E. Service Co. began.
Compare id. at 1055 n.2 (noting that the continuation patents did not issue

until October 1997 and March 1998), with Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E.
Serv. Co., No. C 97-04382 CRB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20235, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 23, 1998) (noting that the lawsuit began in January of 1997), rev'd, 285
F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
134. See Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1050.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 1051.

137. Id. at 1048.
138.

See id. at 1051.
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opportunity to carefully craft the relationship between the
doctrine of equivalents and the dedication rule. Instead, it
simply held that whenever the dedication rule applies, it
trumps the doctrine of equivalents. 139
A. TREATMENT OF PRECEDENT
The Johnson & Johnston opinion began with a quick
overview of Federal Circuit precedent, followed by a more
detailed analysis of Supreme Court precedent. 40 This is
appropriate because Federal Circuit precedent, although
instructive, is not binding on the court, 14 1 whereas Supreme
142
Court precedent is binding.
The Johnson & Johnston court's overview of Federal
Circuit precedent, not surprisingly, began with Maxwell and
ended with YBM Magnex.143 The court noted that Maxwell
established a bright-line dedication rule. 144 Then, the court
recounted YBM Magnex's limitation of Maxwell to its facts by
its establishment of a rule dedicating only disclosed but
unclaimed distinct embodiments. 145
The Johnson & Johnston court spent more time on
Supreme Court precedent. First, the court relied on Edward
Miller and Mahn to emphasize the predominant role of patents'
claims in defining the scope of the property right. 14 6 The court
139. See id. at 1054-55. One could argue that the patentee who discloses
but fails to claim subject matter could get a broadening reissue patent within
two years of issuance and assert the doctrine of equivalents on it. By so doing,
the argument would go, the patentee would trump the dedication rule, thus
refuting the claim that "whenever the dedication rule applies, it trumps the
doctrine of equivalents." The problem with this argument is that, by getting a
broadening reissue patent within two years of issuance, the patentee does not
trump the dedication rule because the dedication rule would not have applied.
The Johnson & Johnston dedication rule applies only in litigation, after the
Markman hearing, when the claims' scope becomes clear. After all, there is no
way to know for sure what subject matter is disclosed but unclaimed until the
court determines what is claimed. Under Johnson & Johnston's rule, in any
particular case where the patentee attempts, post-Markman, to assert the
doctrine of equivalents to cover disclosed but unclaimed subject matter, the
dedication rule trumps the doctrine of equivalents.
140. See id. at 1051-54.
141. In the Federal Circuit, an en banc court such as Johnson & Johnston
may overrule its own precedent. See FED. CIR. R. 35(a)(2).
142. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237-38 (1997).
143. See Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1051-52.
144. See id. at 1051.
145. See id. at 1052.
146. See id. at 1052-53.
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acknowledged that neither case was on point, but it set the
stage for its doctrine-of-equivalents-trumping dedication rule
by borrowing some of their language.1 47 The court recalled that
"'claim [s] actually made operate [] in law as a disclaimer of what
1 48
is not claimed."'
After discussing the early dedication cases, the Johnson &
Johnston court distinguished both Graver Tank and WarnerJenkinson.149
In distinguishing Graver Tank, the court
emphasized that an earlier Court had invalidated the
patentee's claim covering the disclosed manganese welding
flux. 150 Apparently, the Court believed that this distinction
gave it license to decide the case with no influence from Graver
Tank.
In distinguishing Warner-Jenkinson, the Johnson &
Johnston opinion did not even mention the accused infringer's
rejected argument that equivalents should be limited to only
disclosed but unclaimed subject matter. 15 1 The court cursorily
declared that "Warner-Jenkinsondid not present an instance of
the patentee dedicating
subject matter to the public in its
1 52
specification."

B.

JOHNSON & JOHNSTON'S DEDICATION OF ALL THAT IS
DISCLOSED BUT NOT CLAIMED

After discussing Supreme Court precedent, the Johnson &
Johnston court followed Maxwell and announced its bright-line
dedication rule: "[W]hen a patent drafter discloses but declines
to claim subject matter... this action dedicates that unclaimed
subject matter to the public." 153 Allowing such patentees to
assert the doctrine of equivalents, according to the court, would
"conflict with the primacy of the claims in defining the scope of
147.

See id. at 1053.

148. Id. (quoting Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 361 (1884)).
149. See id. at 1053-54.
150. See id. at 1053 & n.1. Judge Dyk, in his concurring opinion, offered
another distinction between Graver Tank and Johnson & Johnston. See id. at
1059-61 (Dyk, J., concurring). He argued that the Graver Tank disclosure was
significantly less clear than the Johnson & Johnston disclosure. Id. at 1061.

Thus, Judge Dyk implied that the Johnson & Johnston rule is limited to
situations in which the subject matter is clearly disclosed but not claimed. See
id.
151. See id. at 1054 (discussing Warner-Jenkinson, but failing to mention

its reference to disclosed but unclaimed equivalents).
152. Id.
153. Id.
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the patentee's exclusive right." 154 The court gave two primary
justifications for its bright-line rule. 155 First, the bright-line
rule would discourage applicants from trying to sneak broad
claims past the USPTO-disclosing broadly, claiming narrowly,
and relying on the doctrine of equivalents. 156 Second, a
patentee who disclosed but did not claim was not without
remedy because he could still get a broadening reissue patent,
57
or a continuation patent.
III. A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPETION OF DEDICATION: A
BETTER APPROACH THAN JOHNSON & JOHNSTON'S
DEDICATION RULE
The Federal Circuit's per curiam opinion in Johnson &
Johnston upsets the balance between the patent system's
protection and notice functions. The Johnson & Johnston
dedication rule purports to bolster the notice function by
58
drawing a bright line, eliminating any zone of uncertainty.
In some cases, however, the line is not nearly so bright as the
Johnson & Johnston court would like to believe. 159 The nature
of language makes it impossible to eliminate all uncertainty
from the scope of patent claims. 160 Johnson & Johnston's
bright-line dedication rule limits patentees' access to the
doctrine of equivalents in a way never contemplated by the
61
Supreme Court, either before or after Johnson & Johnston.'
154. Id. (citing Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1424
(Fed. Cir. 1997)).
155.

Judge Rader's concurring opinion also offered an alternative to the

majority's bright-line rule. His rule would preclude patentees from asserting
the doctrine of equivalents to "capture subject matter that the patent drafter
reasonably could have foreseen during the application process and included in
the claims." Id. at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring).
156. See id. at 1054-55.
157. Id. at 1055.
158. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text (discussing Johnson &
Johnston's bright-line dedication rule); supra note 17 and accompanying text
(discussing the zone of uncertainty).
159. See infra Part III.C.
160. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text (explaining that the
Graver Tank Court allowed patentees to assert the doctrine of equivalents

despite the fact that an earlier Court had invalidated claims that would
literally cover the accused device); supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text

(noting that the Warner-Jenkinson Court's prosecution history estoppel
analysis involves inquiry into the particular facts surrounding the amendment
to determine whether it is patentability-related); supra notes 82-84 (discussing
how the Festo rebuttable presumption of prosecution history estoppel only
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As such, future courts faced with disclosed but unclaimed
equivalents should reject the bright-line dedication rule in
favor of a rule more in tune with the Supreme Court's
protection/notice balance: a Festo-like rebuttable presumption
of dedication.
A. THE JOHNSON & JOHNSTON RULE MISTREATS SUPREME
COURT PRECEDENT

The Johnson & Johnston court missed its opportunity to
resolve two conflicting lines of holdings: Edward Miller and
Mahn for the dedication line, 162 and Graver Tank and WarnerJenkinson for the doctrine of equivalents line. 163 Instead, its
bright-line rule, dedicating all disclosed but unclaimed subject
matter, makes the doctrine of equivalents subservient to the
dedication rule whenever they clash. The Johnson & Johnston
court should have recognized that in Edward Miller and Mahn,
the Supreme Court used language much broader than
necessary to decide the case at bar. The Johnson & Johnston
court should also have realized that both Graver Tank and
Warner-Jenkinson suggested that patentees should be able to
assert the doctrine of equivalents to cover disclosed but
unclaimed subject matter in some circumstances. Clearly,
some remnant of the Edward Miller and Mahn dedication rule
still remains after Johnson & Johnston,164 but its scope is not
nearly as broad.
The Johnson & Johnston court should have shaped its rule
in conformity with Graver Tank and Warner-Jenkinson and
allowed patentees to cover disclosed but unclaimed equivalents
165
with the doctrine of equivalents under some circumstances.
Only five years ago, Warner-Jenkinson properly struck the
balance between the notice function and the protection function
in the doctrine of equivalents context. 166 By fixing the outer
boundary of what subject matter is available to patentees as

prevents patentees who clearly disclaim certain subject matter from asserting
the doctrine of equivalents to cover it).
162. See supra Part I.B.2.
163. See supra Part I.B.1.
164. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,

484 (1989) (noting the general principle that, absent a Supreme Court
reversal, lower courts cannot ignore Supreme Court precedent).
165.
166.

See id.
See supra Part I.B.l.b.
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potential equivalents at the outermost concentric circle, 67 the
Court implied that patentees should be able to cover at least
disclosed but unclaimed subject matter. 168 To the extent that
people relied on Maxwell's bright-line dedication rule, this
Warner-Jenkinson implication should have diminished such
reliance. The YBM Magnex decision recognized this diminished
reliance by limiting Maxwell to its facts. 169 The Johnson &
Johnston court should have at least attempted to resolve
Warner-Jenkinson's disclosed but unclaimed equivalents
70
reference. 1
The Johnson & Johnston court, rather than basing its
decision on rationale gleaned from Graver Tank, sought to
171
distinguish it.
Graver Tank emphasized the importance of
providing patentees fair protection and allowed patentees to
cover the manganese flux even though it was disclosed but not
within the alkaline earth metal claim. 172 The Johnson &
Johnston court noted that Graver Tank's facts were different in
that a court, and not the patentee, caused the accused subject
matter to be unclaimed. 173 Instead, the court should have
noted that in both cases, the accused subject matter was
disclosed but not within the claim-in-suit. 174 Graver Tank is
not exactly on point, but that does not give the Johnson &
Johnston court license to completely ignore it. 175 The last thing
the Johnson & Johnston court should have done was create an
anomaly where a patentee faces no barrier when he wishes to
assert the doctrine of equivalents to cover disclosed subject
matter that is not within the scope of the claim-in-suit,176 but
167.
168.

See supra Part I.B.3.a.
See supra Part I.B.3.a.

169.

See supra note 126 and accompanying text (quoting the YBM Magnex

court, which, relying on Warner-Jenkinson, stated, "Maxwell accords with the

[Supreme] Court's precedent only when its decision is uiderstood and applied
in light of its particular facts").
170.
171.
172.
173.

See
See
See
See

supra note 152 and accompanying text.
supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
supra Part I.B.l.a (detailing Graver Tank's holding).
supra note 150 and accompanying text.

174. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
175. See Nichol v. Pullman Standard., Inc., 889 F.2d 115, 120 n.8 (7th Cir.
1989) (noting that lower federal courts should follow Supreme Court dicta);
United States v. LaBinia, 614 F.2d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that
Supreme Court principles control unless expressly limited to the particular
facts of the case); United States v. Bell, 524 F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1975)
(noting that Supreme Court dicta should not be disregarded).
176. See supra Part I.B l.a (noting that the Graver Tank patentee was able
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faces an insurmountable barrier when he wishes to assert the
doctrine of equivalents to cover disclosed subject matter that
177
was never claimed.
The Johnson & Johnston court placed too much emphasis
on two cases decided more than a century ago in entirely
different contexts. 178 In those cases, the Supreme Court
invalidated the patentees' broadening reissue patents. 179 In so
doing, the Court prevented patentees from asserting property
rights, under a pretense of inadvertence, after they had
knowingly allowed a market to develop for the disclosed but
unclaimed subject matter. 180 No doubt, such situations lie at
the heart of what Johnson & Johnston's rule was trying to
prevent. When given the opportunity, however, to reiterate
Edward Miller's broad dedication rule in less notice functiondiminishing situations, like those in Graver Tank and WarnerJenkinson, the Supreme Court declined to do so. 181 That the
Court has never overruled Edward Miller or its progeny, and
has overwhelmingly affirmed the doctrine of equivalents at
each opportunity suggests that both must interrelate with each
other in some way. Supreme Court precedent mandates,
contrary to the Johnson & Johnston rule, that patentees should
be able to assert the doctrine of equivalents to cover disclosed
but unclaimed equivalents in at least some circumstances.
B. FESTO CONFIRMS JOHNSON & JOHNSTON'S BALANCE
FAILURE

The Supreme Court's reversal in Festo of the Federal
Circuit's bright-line prosecution history estoppel rule as
improperly upsetting the protection/notice balance' 82 shows
that Johnson & Johnston's similar rule upsets the same
to assert the doctrine of equivalents to cover his disclosed manganese flux that
was not within his asserted claim).
177.

See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text (announcing the

Johnson & Johnston dedication rule). For an explanation of why a patentee
could not get past the Johnson & Johnston rule's barrier by getting a
broadening reissue patent within two years of issuance, see supra note 128.
178. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
179. Supra note 96 and accompanying text (explaining Edward Miller's
context); supra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining Mahn's context).
180. See supra Part I.B.2.a-b.
181. See supra Part I.B.3.a (discussing how references from both Graver
Tank and Warner-Jenkinson contradict the broad dedication rule announced
in Edward Miller and Mahn).
182. See supra Part I.B.l.c.
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balance. Festo's rebuttable presumption of prosecution history
estoppel recognizes the notice function importance of holding
patentees accountable for behavior perceived to indicate
disclaimer of the subject matter. 18 3 Festo also recognizes that
the mere act of amendment is not conclusive evidence of such
behavior.184 Johnson & Johnston recognizes the former but not
the latter. 18 5 Johnson & Johnston's rule views the mere fact
that the patentee disclosed subject matter that falls outside his
claims' literal scope as conclusive evidence of disclaimer. 8 6 As
such, the rule upsets the Supreme Court's protection/notice
balance, struck most recently in Festo.
C. THE JOHNSON & JOHNSTON RULE UNFAIRLY ELIMINATES
PATENT PROTECTION WHEN CLAIM CONSTRUCTION LEAVES
DISCLOSED SUBJECT MATTER UNCLAIMED

The gravest injustice resulting from Johnson & Johnston's
dedication rule is that it unfairly holds patentees accountable
for striking the perfect balance between disclosing enough to
87
satisfy the written description and enablement requirements,1
and not disclosing so much that the disclosure exceeds the
claim's scope. 18 8 This is a tall order because patentees cannot
be sure of their claims' scope until long after they must comply
8 9
with the enablement and written description requirements.1
Patentees can only claim their inventions as clearly as words
will allow them. 190
Parties often hotly contest claim
construction at Markman hearings,191 signifying that
183. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (describing Festo's
rebuttable presumption of prosecution history estoppel).
184. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.*
185. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (stating uncategorically
that a patentee's act of disclosing subject matter but not claiming it dedicates
such subject matter to the public).
186. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., Exxon Research & Eng'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("We engage in claim construction every day, and cases
frequently present close questions of claim construction on which expert
witnesses, trial courts, and even the judges of this court may disagree."); N.
Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(Rader, J., dissenting) (noting that the Markman hearing was "very close");
Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(contesting the meaning of the claim term "right angle corner border pieces").
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determining the exact meaning of claim terms is by no means
cut and dry. Therefore, it stands to reason that a patentee
could attempt to claim all disclosed equivalents, fight for such a
claim construction, and end up with disclosed but unclaimed
192
equivalents as a result of an adverse Markman ruling.
Denying such a hard-luck patentee access to the doctrine of
equivalents, as mandated by Johnson & Johnston's bright-line
dedication rule, would be unfair.
Barring hard-luck patentees who attempted to strike the
balance but inadvertently disclosed more than they claimed
from asserting the doctrine of equivalents runs contrary to the
purpose of the original dedication rule: to hold patentees to
their categorical disclaimer of the disclosed but unclaimed
subject matter. 193 Such patentees are, instead, the victims of
the natural limitations of the written word. 194 In these
situations, the disclosed subject matter is neither clearly the
patentee's property, nor clearly public property, until after the
Markman hearing. 195 Therefore, treating such patentees the
same as patentees who disclose subject matter and expressly
disclaim it would be unfair.
Allowing patentees who attempt to claim all disclosed
subject matter, but end up on the wrong side of a Markman
ruling, to assert the doctrine of equivalents would not

192. Continuing with the pharmaceutical company example, see supra Part
I.B.1, suppose it disclosed "between 1.5 and 2.5 grams of Chemical X" in its
patent specification, and claimed "roughly 2.0 grams of Chemical X." Suppose
then, that the pharmaceutical company sued a competitor for making a drug
containing 1.5 grams of Chemical X. Both parties could intensely dispute the
claim construction. The pharmaceutical company could argue that "roughly
2.0" means "between 1.5 and 2.5," and its competitor could argue that it means
"between 1.6 and 2.4." If the court agreed with the pharmaceutical company's
competitor, 1.5 grams of Chemical X would be left disclosed but outside the
literal scope of the pharmaceutical company's claim. The Johnson & Johnston
rule would prevent the pharmaceutical company from asserting the doctrine of
equivalents against its competitor, regardless of how insubstantially different
1.5 grams is from 1.6 grams. Thus the competitor could sidestep the time and
development costs, copy everything exactly, and make an insubstantial change
to avoid infringement. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co.,
339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). This is precisely the type of situation that the
doctrine of equivalents was designed to prevent. See id. at 608.
193. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (noting that "the nature of
language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent
application").
195. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (defining a hard-luck
patentee).
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encourage applicants to attempt to sneak broad claims past the
USPTO. 196 If a court finds that a patentee disclosed broadly
and claimed narrowly to avoid USPTO scrutiny, it should hold
that the patentee does not rebut the presumption of dedication
as a matter of law. 197 A hard-luck patentee would have shown
the USPTO all his cards during prosecution. 198 The patentee
and the examiner agreed on a set of claims that they believed
accurately captured the invention.1 99 Only the limitations
of
20 0
words resulted in disclosed but unclaimed subject matter.
The hard-luck patentee would find no comfort in either of
Johnson & Johnston's proposed alternative remedies. 20 1 Both
broadening reissue patents and continuation patents are for
patentees and applicants who are dissatisfied with their claims'
scope. 20 2 The hard-luck patentee would be happy with his
claim's scope until after a Markman hearing. 20 3 No hard-luck
patentee would seek either a broadening reissue patent or a
continuation patent because he would believe that his claims
20 4
were as broad as his specification would support.
A perfect example of a hard-luck patentee is the patentee
in Unique Concepts.20 5 As described above, 20 6 the Unique
Concepts majority construed "right angle corner border pieces"
to mean preformed frame corners, thus leaving mitered frame
corners disclosed but not claimed. 20 7 The patentee, however,
argued, and convinced dissenting Judge Rich, that "right angle
corner border pieces" defined a class of which preformed frame
208
corners and mitered frame corners were members.
Therefore, because the Unique Concepts patentee was unable to
196. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 104, 123, 156 and accompanying text (describing the
situation in which patentees attempt to sneak broad claims past the USPTO, a
situation that is unquestionably at the heart of the dedication rule).
198. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (noting that a hard-luck
patentee attempted to claim all disclosed subject matter).
199. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (quoting'Festo as stating
that "the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a
thing in a patent application").
201. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
205. 939 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
206. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
208. Unique Concepts, 939 F.2d at 1567-68 (Rich, J., dissenting).
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convince just one more judge of his claim construction, his
20 9
mitered frame corners were left disclosed but unclaimed.
Under Johnson & Johnston's bright-line dedication rule, the
Unique Concepts patentee would not be able to argue that the
mitered frame corners were equivalent to the preformed frame
corners.2 10 The disclosure, coupled with the failure to explicitly
claim, would dedicate the mitered frame corners to the
public. 211
D. A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF DEDICATION ACCORDS
WITH WARNER-JENKINSON AND FESTO

Future courts faced with a patentee who has disclosed
more than he has claimed should reject the Johnson &
Johnston rule in favor of a rebuttable presumption of
dedication. A rebuttable presumption of dedication would fall
somewhere between a rule that would determine dedication
based on all the facts and circumstances and the Johnson &
An all-facts-andJohnston bright-line dedication rule.
circumstances rule would result in too much harm to the notice
function because, too often, it would place disclosed but
unclaimed subject matter within the zone of uncertainty, thus
21 2
preventing competitors fromi designing around the patent.
Johnson & Johnston's bright-line dedication rule results in too
much harm to the protection function because, too often, it
strips hard-luck patentees21 3of valuable protection, thus diluting
the incentive to innovate.
A rebuttable presumption of dedication would serve the
notice function better than an all-facts-and-circumstances rule
because competitors would know that, absent exceptional
circumstances, a patentee dedicates disclosed but unclaimed
subject matter to the public. 2 14 Moreover, as soon as a patentee
209. Id. at 1562-63.
210. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. The Unique Concepts
court actually applied the doctrine of equivalents, but found the mitered frame
corners not equivalent to the preformed frame corners. Supra note 105 and
accompanying text (citing Unique Concepts, 939 F.2d at 1563-64).
211. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (stating Johnson &
Johnston's bright-line dedication rule).
212. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (discussing the
importance of minimizing uncertainty in the scope of a patent's property
rights).
213. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text (emphasizing the need
for fair patent protection to provide incentives to innovate).
214. See infra Part III.D.1 (describing the exceptional circumstances under

2003]

PROTECTING THE HARD-LUCK PATENTEE

807

acts to negate hard luck, 2 15 competitors can be certain that such
subject matter is public property. A rebuttable presumption of
dedication would serve the protection function better than
Johnson & Johnston's bright-line dedication rule because it
would not deem disclosed but unclaimed subject matter
dedicated unless the patentee acted affirmatively to disclaim
it.216

Faced with similar protection/notice problems, the
Supreme Court's two most recent doctrine of equivalents cases
struck the proper balance by adopting a rebuttable
presumption. 2 17
Both Warner-Jenkinson and Festo first
endorsed a flexible application of the doctrine of equivalents,
and then announced a rebuttable presumption. 2 18 Both cases
recognized the importance of holding patentees to their
proclamations of what subject matter is not their property. 2 19
Competitors would be much less likely to design around
claimed inventions if patentees were later able to assert
property rights in such subject matter. 220 Festo's rule, however,
also recognized the detrimental protection function effect that
would result if patentees' actions taken many years earlier
served as conclusive evidence of such a proclamation. 221
Forcing patent applicants to predict the future in order to fairly
protect their inventions would surely stifle innovation because
applicants would be weary of undertaking a financial risk
without the promise of enforceable exclusive rights. 222
Similarly, a presumption of dedication, rebuttable only by
demonstrating a consistent pattern of behavior indicating that
which the patentee can assert the doctrine of equivalents to cover disclosed
but unclaimed subject matter).
215. See infra Part III.D.1 (describing two types of acts that negate a
patentee's hard luck).
216. See infra Part III.D.1 (listing the two ways a patentee can
affirmatively disclaim subject matter).

217. See supra notes 75, 78-79 and accompanying text (describing the
holding in Warner-Jenkinson); supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text
(describing the holding in Festo).
218. See supra notes 75, 78-79, 82-86 and accompanying text.
219.

See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.

220. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (describing the
importance of clear notice to competitors who wish to design around patents).
221. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (noting the unfairness of
holding a patentee to clear claims when the claims cannot be made clearly).
222. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (explaining how the promise
of exclusive rights is often the only economic justification for investing in

innovation).
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the patentee attempted in good faith to claim the disclosed
subject matter most fairly balances the notice and protection
functions.
1. A Patentee Can Rebut the Presumption of Dedication by
Demonstrating Hard Luck
To show hard luck, patentees must demonstrate at least
two things. First, the patentee must have consistently made
reasonable arguments for a claim construction that would
literally cover the accused subject matter. 223
Even an
inconsistent claim construction argument in a previous case
will negate a finding of hard luck. 224 If the patentee argues for
a claim construction that would leave subject matter disclosed
but unclaimed, or if his claim language prevents him from
making a reasonable argument that the subject matter is
literally claimed, he proclaims to the world that such subject
matter is not his property.2 25 Holding otherwise, and allowing
him to assert the doctrine of equivalents, would result in too
much harm to the notice function. Second, a patentee must not
have attempted to cover the disclosed but unclaimed (as a
result of an adverse Markman ruling) subject matter with
226
either a broadening reissue patent or a continuation patent.
Only patentees who are dissatisfied with their claims' scope
would resort to such measures.2 27 The hard-luck patentee
would have believed that his claims satisfactorily covered
everything he disclosed. 228 He would believe that his disclosure
would not support broader claims and would forego corrective
measures. 229 Therefore, a patentee who attempts to cover
subject matter with a separate broadening reissue patent or a
continuation patent proclaims to the world that his first patent

223. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text (noting that the
patentee advocates for his interpretation of the claim terms at a Markman
hearing).
224. See Rachel Marie Clark, Note, Collateral Estoppel of Claim
Interpretation After Markman, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1581, 1613-14 (2002)
(discussing collateral estoppel in the claim interpretation context).
225. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text; supra note 157 and
accompanying text (noting the two alternative remedies to patentees who
recognize that they did not claim all that they disclosed).
227. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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does not secure property rights in such subject matter. 230
2. A Rebuttable Presumption of Dedication is Consistent with
Graver Tank
A rebuttable presumption of dedication is consistent with
the rebuttable presumption trend started in Warner-Jenkinson,
and followed in Festo, and is likewise consistent with Graver
Tank. In Graver Tank, the patentee did not argue for a claim
construction that would literally have encompassed the accused
flux. 23 1 One might argue, then, that the Graver Tank patentee
was not a hard-luck patentee, and thus could not have rebutted
the presumption of dedication. 232 If this were true, the Graver
Tank patentee would not have had access to the doctrine of
equivalents, a result that would clearly conflict with Graver
Tank's actual holding. 233 The problem with this analysis is that
the rebuttable presumption of dedication would never have
applied to the Graver Tank patentee. Under this Comment's
proposed rule, only patentees who disclosed but failed to claim
are presumed to have dedicated. 234 Such an act is a disclaimer
of the disclosed but unclaimed subject matter. 235 The Graver
Tank patentee, on the other hand, did not fail to claim, and
therefore did not impliedly disclaim, the disclosed subject
matter. 236
The rebuttable presumption of dedication is
consistent with Graver Tank because the Graver Tank patentee
did not disclose, but failed to claim, the accused flux. 237
230.

See supra note 101 and accompanying text (noting that disclosing but

failing to claim property is a signal that the unclaimed property does not
belong to the patentee).
231. The Graver Tank patentee could not have done so because claims that
literally would have covered the manganese flux were invalidated in earlier
litigation. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.

232. See supra text accompanying note 223 (stating that a "patentee must
have consistently [argued] for a claim construction that would literally cover
the accused subject matter" to prove hard-luck).
233. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting that the Graver

Tank Court found the accused infringer liable to the patentee under the
doctrine of equivalents).
234.

See

supra Part

III.D

(proposing a rebuttable

presumption

of

dedication).
235. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (noting that conclusive
evidence of disclaimer is a proclamation to the world that subject matter is not
the patentee's property).
236.

See supra note 66 and accompanying text (explaining that the Graver

Tank patentee had claimed the accused manganese flux, but that claims to it
were invalidated in earlier litigation).
237.

See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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3. The Johnson & Johnston Patentee Would Not Have Been
Able to Rebut the Presumption of Dedication
Applying the rebuttable presumption of dedication to the
facts of Johnson & Johnston, it is clear that the Johnson &
Johnston patentee would not have been able to demonstrate
hard luck.238 The Johnson & Johnston patentee did not argue
that its claim to an aluminum substrate literally covered the
disclosed steel substrate. 239 One might argue that if the
Johnson & Johnston patentee had known its case would be
decided under the rebuttable presumption of dedication, it
would have made the literal infringement argument simply to
preserve its right to plead hard luck and cover the steel
substrate under the doctrine of equivalents. Such a tactic,
however, would not suffice to show hard luck. To show hard
luck, a patentee must have ended up on the wrong end of a
Markman ruling, despite having made a reasonable argument
that his claim literally covered the disclosed subject matter
embodied in the accused product or process. 2 40 Arguing that a
claim to an aluminum substrate literally covers the accused
steel substrate is not reasonable.
Thus, the Johnson &
Johnston patentee would not be able to demonstrate hard luck
and thereby rebut the presumption of dedication. 24 1 The
Johnson & Johnston patentee would not be able to assert the
doctrine of equivalents to cover the accused steel substrate
because it would be deemed to have dedicated the steel
substrate to the public.
The Johnson & Johnston patentee would also be unable to
rebut the presumption of dedication because it sought to
protect the disclosed steel substrate with two continuation
patents. 242 The Johnson & Johnston patentee was clearly
238. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text (detailing Johnson &
Johnston'srelevant facts).
239. Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Servs. Co., No. C 97-4382 CRB,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13142, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 1998) (stating that
"[a]ll parties... agree that, at a minimum, 'aluminum' means 'commercial
grade aluminum').
240. See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text (noting that
inconsistent claim construction arguments negate hard luck).
242. See supra note 133 (noting that the Johnson & Johnston patentee had
filed for and received two continuation patents to the steel substrate); supra
notes 226-30 and accompanying text (explaining that attempts to cover
disclosed but unclaimed subject matter with a continuation patent or
broadening reissue patent negates hard luck).
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dissatisfied with its claim's scope, and thought its disclosure
would support a broader scope. A hard-luck patentee would
have believed that his claim's scope was as broad as his
Therefore, the Johnson &
disclosure would support. 243
Johnston patentee, by attempting to cover the disclosed steel
substrate with the two continuation patents, proclaimed to the
world that its original patent did not cover the steel substrate.
The rebuttable presumption of dedication would prevent the
Johnson & Johnston patentee from asserting the doctrine of
equivalents to cover the steel substrate.
Future courts should allow patentees who make a
reasonable attempt to literally claim all disclosed subject
matter, but find themselves on the wrong end of a Markman
ruling, to assert the doctrine of equivalents to cover disclosed
but unclaimed subject matter. 244 Courts should deem all other
patentees who disclose but fail to claim subject matter to have
dedicated such subject matter to the public. 245 Allowing hardluck patentees to assert the doctrine of equivalents does not
mean that patentees can necessarily prevent their competitors
from practicing all of its disclosed but unclaimed subject
matter. It only allows courts to ask the question, "Is the
disclosed, accused device equivalent to the device recited in the
claims?"246 Such a flexible application of the doctrine of
equivalents is consistent with the Supreme Court trend most
recently followed in Festo.24 7 A rebuttable presumption of
dedication, also consistent with the Supreme Court trend of
applying rebuttable presumptions in doctrine of equivalents
248
cases, assures that courts protect only hard-luck patentees.
In all other cases, the notice function carries the day.

243. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
244. See supra Part III.D (proposing a rebuttable presumption of
dedication).
245. See supra Part III.D; supra Part I.B.2 (noting the important notice
function policy concerns furthered by dedication).
246. See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining that the doctrine of equivalents works
to extend the scope of patentees' rights to exclude accused products that are
equivalent to the claimed invention).
247. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (describing the WarnerJenkinson Court's flexible application); supra note 80 and accompanying text
(describing the Festo court's flexible application).
248. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (outlining WarnerJenkinson's rebuttable presumption standard); supra notes 85-86 and
accompanying text (outlining Festo's rebuttable presumption standard).
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CONCLUSION
In Johnson & Johnston, the Federal Circuit impermissibly
restricted the doctrine of equivalents's viability by preventing
patentees from asserting the doctrine to cover disclosed but
unclaimed equivalents. The court's bright-line dedication rule
was improper when handed down, and a similar application by
any future court would be even more improper in light of Festo.
When faced with a situation in which a patentee has disclosed
subject matter but not claimed it, courts should apply a
rebuttable presumption of dedication. Such a rule would
restore the balance between the protection function and the
notice function struck by the Supreme Court, and thereby best
promote the progress of science and the useful arts.

